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This paper investigates strategic interaction between rational agents whose preferences
evolve over time. Players face a pecuniary ‘game of life’ comprising the ultimatum game
and the dictator game. Utility may but need not be attached to the reciprocation of fair
and unfair play by the opponent and equitable payoff distributions as proposed by Falk
and Fischbacher (2001). Evolutionary fitness is determined solely by material success –
regardless of the motives for its achievement. Agents cannot explicitly condition the social
component of their preferences on whether they face the ultimatum or dictator game.
Under these conditions, agents develop a strong preference for reciprocation but little
interest in an equitable distribution as such. This corresponds to equitable ultimatum
offers but full surplus appropriation by dictators. Adding an exogenous constraint on the
possible divergence between preference for reciprocation and for an equitable distribution
either makes ultimatum divisions asymmetric or dictators become generous depending on
the relative frequency of ultimatum and dictator interaction.
1Financial support from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) is gratefully ac-
knowledged.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In experimental investigations of the ultimatum game, participants quite con-
sistently offer 30-50% of an available monetary surplus as first-moving proposers.
They reject offers of less than 20% as second-moving responders, which results in
no player receiving anything. Particularly the latter observation is hard to reconcile
with the assumption that economic actors are rational maximizers of their mone-
tary payoffs.2 By including a consideration for fairness conventions and reciprocity
in players’ preferences observations can be explained very well. This is true not
only for the ultimatum game, but also many other games for which experimental
findings are puzzling from a monetary-payoff maximization point of view.
Neoclassical theory does not restrict preferences to be based only on monetary
payoffs or to be strictly monotonic in them. But economic agents who are spiteful,
enjoy a warm glow donating money to anonymous strangers, or feel it worthwhile
to incur private costs to punish free-riders of public goods have certainly not been
the conventional assumption in economics. The award of 2002’s Bank of Sweden
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel to Daniel Kahneman and
Vernon Smith for “Foundations of Behavioral and Experimental Economics” is only
one indicator that this is changing fast.
In adopting a more realistic view of homo oeconomicus, however, one should
be careful to not jump to the other extreme, i. .e. to count any observation of
supposedly odd behavior as evidence that ‘standard assumptions’ are wrong and to
suppose that human beings universally exhibit the nicer-than-expected character
exhibited in some laboratory experiments. The latter would be invalidated by
many other experiments, e. g. on market games, in which participants’ behavior is
explained well by egoistic maximization of monetary rewards. Also, the tale – told
in different versions before the advent of behavioral economics – that (an unspecified
kind of) evolution would make economic agents behave as if they indeed maximized
their payoffs in a world of scarce material resources in our view contains some
grain of truth. The question is: Under which circumstances is behavior more of
the ‘standard’ homo oeconomicus-type, and which environments defined by which
conditions induce human beings to act e. g. like homo reciprocans (cp. Fehr and
Ga¨chter 1998) and benevolent dictators?
This paper combines methods of evolutionary and behavioral game theory. We
attempt to make progress on the above question about environmental and psycho-
logical determinants of material-payoff maximization as opposed to social prefer-
ences in a very simple model. We concentrate on a possible preference for reci-
2The argument that stakes are simply too small for people to bother about monetary pay-
off maximization has been countered by experiments in which stakes were equivalent of several
month’s income of participants (e. g. the experiments conducted in Indonesia by Cameron 1999
or in the Slovak Republic by Slonim and Roth 1998).
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procity as formalized by Falk and Fischbacher (2001), in an environment consisting
not of just one, but two distinct distribution tasks. As a first approximation of the
complexities of the real ‘game of life’, we study evolution of reciprocity-based pref-
erences in a world where agents randomly face either the ultimatum or the dictator
game.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The following section clarifies
the terms reciprocity and fairness, compares recent approaches to the definition
of preferences that result in reciprocal behavior, and explains our choice of the
Falk-Fischbacher formulation. Section 3 gives a brief introduction to the indirect
evolutionary approach, section 4 presents our model, which is analyzed in section 5
with focus on the question: Under which circumstances is a reciprocity-based notion
of fairness evolutionary stable? Section 6 compares results to those obtained in a
related model by Gu¨th and Napel (2002). Section 7 concludes.
2. RECIPROCITY
Positive (negative) reciprocity refers to the impulse or desire to be kind (unkind)
to those who have been kind (unkind) to us.4 Reciprocity is to be distinguished
from simple altruism, i. e. unconditional generosity. While the narrow self-interest
hypothesis in ‘standard theory’ fails to explain stylized facts of many experiments,
the notion of reciprocity preference sheds a fairly consistent light on possible moti-
vational forces behind a number of observations. This section briefly points to major
contributions to the literature which incorporate reciprocal behavior into standard
game theory, starting with a stylized description of the experimental observations
that motivated them.5
2.1. Evidence from Experiments
In experimental ultimatum games, most proposers offer between thirty and fifty
percent of the available surplus (‘pie’) to the receiver while offers below twenty
percent are rare.6 Small offers are usually rejected by responders, in which case
both players receive a zero share; the rejection rate decreases in the amount offered
to the responder. An important observation is that responders more likely accept
3What we in the following refer to as a multi-game environment can also be viewed as a
recurrent version of a comprehensive single game, in which Nature has the first move and selects
either an ultimatum or dictator subgame.
4See Fehr and Ga¨chter (1998) for a more detailed account.
5Compare Klein (2000) for a detailed comparison of literature on reciprocity. Also see the
recent overview by Fehr and Schmidt (2002).
6Analysis of the ultimatum game was pioneered by Gu¨th, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982).
For surveys on ultimatum games see Thaler (1988), Gu¨th and Tietz (1990), Camerer and Thaler
(1995) and Roth (1995).
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lower offers when these are known to be made by a random device rather than a
human player. In the related best-shot game, the proposer can only choose between
two payoff distributions – one very advantageous, one very disadvantageous to
himself or herself. Here, participants usually accept a higher degree of inequity
than in the ultimatum game.7 In the dictator game the second player is no longer
responding but must accept any offer by the first player. Proposers usually offer
less than in ultimatum games. However, about 80 percent offer a positive amount.8
In the gift-exchange game the first mover (firm) offers a wage w to the second
mover (worker). The worker responds by choosing a level of privately costly effort.
Higher wages yield lower payoff for the firms and higher ones for workers, while
higher effort levels have the opposite effect. The standard game-theoretic prediction
based on individual maximization of payoffs is that workers invariably choose the
lowest possible effort level. In anticipation of this, firms will only make the lowest
possible wage offer. In contrast to these predictions, many experimental subjects as
well as real firms offer wages above the market rate, and are rewarded by positive
effort levels increasing in wage.9
In public goods games agents simultaneously decide whether to pay for the pro-
vision of a public good. Experiments show that the amount subjects contribute
is increasing in their expectation about the contributions of others.10 Fehr and
Ga¨chter (2000) provide evidence that a significant fraction of subjects is willing to
bear additional private costs if detected free-riders can be punished.
All these experimental results strongly suggest that subjects care about more
than their own material payoff. Fairness considerations of one sort or the other seem
important; analytical models with predictive value should take this into account.
Different approaches to this are conceivable.
2.2. Equity-based Approaches
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) are the most promi-
nent models of agents with preferences that exhibit inequity aversion. Agents may
increase their utility by sacrificing their own material payoff if by doing so their
payoff is closer to their counterparts’ payoffs. Preferences can depend on the entire
payoff distribution, but not on any intentions ascribed to other players.
In Fehr and Schmidt (1999), agents dislike inequitable outcomes, but less so
7The best-shot game was introduced by Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) and Prasnikar and
Roth (1992). See also Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2000).
8See, for example, Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton (1994) and Andreoni and Miller
(2002).
9See, for example, Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), Falk and Ga¨chter (2002) or Fehr,
Ga¨chter, and Kirchsteiger (1996).
10For surveys on public goods games see Ledyard (1995) and Daws and Thaler (1988).
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when these are to their own advantage. Despite its simplicity, many stylized facts
can be explained by this assumption. The model is consistent with giving in dic-
tator, gift-exchange and closely related trust games and with the rejection of low
offers in ultimatum games. Since the model does not account for intentions, it fails
to explain why people behave differently when playing against a random device
instead of a real player, or why low offers in a best-shot game are more readily
accepted than in an ultimatum game.
The approach by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) is similar. Their model contains
fewer assumptions about functional forms than that of Fehr and Schmidt and agents
compare own material payoff to the group’s average, making the reference point for
fairness considerations endogenous. Marginal disutility of small deviations from
equality is assumed to be zero; so if subjects are non-satiated in their own material
payoff they will never propose an equal split in the dictator game. The model
can explain giving in dictator and gift-exchange games as well as rejections in
ultimatum games. However, it fails to explain punishment patterns in public goods
games. Neither can it explain behavior that depends on inequities between other
players.11
2.3. Intention-based Approaches
A crucial feature of the psychology of reciprocity is that decisions to be kind
or unkind to others are based not only on material consequences implied by other
players’ actions but also on the intentions attributed to these players. Agents who
are motivated by reciprocity discriminate between players who take an (un)generous
action by choice and those who are forced to do so.12
Prominent formal formalizations of reciprocity in terms of intentions have been
given by Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2001) and Falk and Fis-
chbacher (2001). Rabin was the first to adopt the framework of psychological games
of Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989) to model reciprocity. He introduced
so-called fairness games in which a reciprocity payoff is added to the material pay-
off of the players. The reciprocity payoff is calculated as the product of a kindness
term and a reciprocity term. The kindness term is positive whenever a player feels
11For example, Charness and Rabin (2002) let a player C choose between the material payoff
allocations (xA, xB , xC) = (575, 575, 575) and (900,300,600), in both of which player C receives
his or her fair share of 1
3
. Bolton and Ockenfels’ model predicts the second choice as the payoff
for player C is higher, but 54% of subjects choose the first allocation in the experiments.
12Experimental evidence is given in Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003) for four different mini-
ultimatum games. In each game the proposer had two choices, one of which was always to offer
20%. The alternatives were 0%, 20% 50% or 80% respectively. The rejection rate of the 20% offer
was highest when the alternative was equal division, it was lowest when the only alternative was
to offer nothing to the second player. The fact that the rejection rate was not zero in this case
suggests that pure equity considerations also play a role.
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being treated well. Then he or she tries to make the reciprocity term positive, too,
in order to increase his or her total utility payoff. This can be achieved by being
nice in return, as the reciprocity term is defined to be positive when the player
chooses a kind action. Negative reciprocity is modelled analogously.
Rabin’s original model is restricted to two-player normal form games. Dufwen-
berg and Kirchsteiger (2001) generalize Rabin’s model to n-person extensive form
games of imperfect information. Requiring that behavior is sequentially rational,
the main complication is to keep track of the beliefs which determine the attributed
intentions as the game evolves.
Falk and Fischbacher (2001) extend Rabin’s approach to perfect information
extensive form games with finitely many stages. They construct a utility function
that allows for pure equity concern and for intention-based reciprocity. This com-
bination implies an additional degree of freedom by which – as is to be expected –
more experimental observations can be explained than by either pure approach.
Equilibrium calculations and parameter calibrations are already complex for en-
tirely intention-based models of reciprocity;13 this becomes yet more pressing with
Falk and Fischbacher’s hybrid model.
Both Falk and Fischbacher (2001) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2001) pro-
duce predictions more or less in line with the experimental observations mentioned
above. For the ultimatum game, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s model unfortu-
nately yields multiple sequential reciprocity equilibria (SRE). In all SREs high of-
fers are accepted and low offers are rejected. However, there is no unique prediction
for responder reaction to medium-range offers. For every parameter constellation
there exists an SRE in which the proposer offers the smallest amount which is ac-
ceptable to the responder. For high reciprocity parameters there also exist SREs
in which equilibrium offers are rejected, because the players view one another as
unkind, which in equilibrium, in fact, has both players act unkindly.
Falk and Fischbacher’s reciprocity equilibrium for the ultimatum game involves
a mixed responder strategy. Acceptance probability is increasing in the offered
amount up to a cut-off level, from which on the offer is always accepted. The
cut-off is decreasing in the responder’s reciprocity parameter and always lower
than one half. The optimal offer by a selfish proposer matches this level. If the
proposer is reciprocal, too, his or her offer can but need not be more generous,
depending on how reciprocal he or she is relative to the responder. The equilibrium
in random-offer ultimatum games, in which the offer is not determined by a human
but by a random device, highlights the role of intentions: Because no intentions are
attributed to a random offer, the acceptance probability of a given offer is higher
than in the regular ultimatum game. It is not necessarily one, because pure equity
considerations also play a role.
13See Klein (2000, p. 24) for similar thoughts on reciprocity-models.
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The model of Falk and Fischbacher (2001) correctly predicts the main stylized
facts for the gift-exchange game, too. Worker’s effort choice is increasing in wage
paid and her reciprocity parameter. Strictly positive wages result. Predictions by
the Falk and Fischbacher model for the best-shot game, the dictator game and the
public goods game are similarly consistent with the experimental evidence discussed
above. This and its comprehensiveness – covering pure inequity aversion or pure
intentional reciprocity as special cases – makes it a very powerful tool for the
analysis of many different games and our choice in the following analysis.
3. INDIRECT EVOLUTION
The indirect evolutionary approach studies the evolution of preferences among
rational decision makers. Agents are rational in the sense that they have prefer-
ences and select strategies with the goal to maximize expected utility. Preferences
can but need not depend on an agent’s individual material payoff alone, they may
e. g. exhibit reciprocity in the way discussed above. However, it is assumed that
(average) material payoffs ultimately determine the fitness of agents having partic-
ular preferences – and hence preferences themselves – in an evolutionary process:
Agents with preferences that earn material payoffs above (below) the average re-
produce more (less) successfully, and their and their preferences’ population share
increase (decrease).
The considered agents make choices based on anticipated consequences, evaluat-
ing their options by preferences which evolved dependent on past successes. Thus,
as argued in more detail e. g. in Berninghaus, Gu¨th, and Kliemt (2003) and Gu¨th,
Kliemt, and Napel (2003), the indirect evolutionary approach combines the main
elements of the traditional neoclassical approach (rational purposeful actions se-
lected according to their anticipated consequences or the ‘shadow of the future’)
and the direct evolutionary approach (agents carry out fixed behavioral programs
which evolve based only on past success or the ‘shadow of the past ’).14
Utility and material payoff are distinguished. Agents’ objectives – including
possibly a preference for reciprocity – are described by their utility functions,
which under additional conditions imply a unique equilibrium outcome for a given
game. Equilibrium material payoffs are interpreted as fitness of the respective
14The difference between the direct and indirect evolutionary approaches is smaller than it
appears: Models that study the evolution of behavior can be regarded as the special case of
preference evolution where feasible preferences are restricted to make a distinct feasible strategy
strictly dominant. Models that study preference evolution in a game Γ can be regarded as studying
direct evolution in a higher-level game Γ′. The latter can be constructed by identifying each
player’s strategy set S′ with the possible preferences on outcomes of Γ and by taking the payoff
function pi′ to be the composition pi ◦ µ of the mapping µ from strategy profiles S′N in Γ′ (i. e.
a preference regarding outcomes of Γ for each player i ∈ N) to equilibrium strategy profiles of Γ
and the original payoff function pi.
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preference type. A number of studies has used this method to evaluate the sta-
bility of different kinds of preferences in specific single-game environments. Huck
and Oechssler (1999), for example, explore spiteful preferences in a mini-version
of the ultimatum game. Koc¸kesen, Ok, and Sethi (2000a) and Koc¸kesen, Ok, and
Sethi (2000b) analyze interdependent preferences in symmetric aggregative games
and certain classes of symmetric supermodular and submodular games, respec-
tively. Sethi and Somanathan (2001) consider reciprocal preferences in aggregative
games. Berninghaus, Gu¨th, and Kliemt (2003) study the trust game and Poulsen
and Poulsen (2003) investigate reciprocity, altruism, and materialism in prisoner’s
dilemma games.
Using the same utility function in different games, it is possible to calculate
material success of general aspects of preferences in a complex environment. A
particular sense of fairness (or absence thereof) seems to be such a general character
trait rather than a game-specific preference. The indirect evolutionary approach
extended to multiple games thus lends itself to stability tests of the preferences
discussed in section 2.
The assumption of preferences for reciprocity has been justified above in terms
of its success in making sense of and predicting behavior in experiments. Finding
preferences so that they fit a given set of experimental results is useful in a de-
scriptive sense. This may, however, be regarded as merely a question of sufficiently
many free parameters and econometric exercise. We want to investigate if the as-
sumption could be justified even without the data, just by answering the question:
Which preferences within a given class – which is a restriction already – would one
expect to prevail given the axiom that evolutionary success is monotonic in mate-
rial payoffs? Evolutionary stability of reciprocity would in our view constitute an
additional reason to update the common narrow view of homo oeconomicus as a
purely self-interested materialist.
The following analysis is motivated by Gu¨th and Napel (2002). There, equity-
based preferences similar to those of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) are subjected to
evolutionary pressures in an environment consisting of a highly stylized ‘game of
life’. It does clearly not reflect the complexities of the real ‘game of life’ which
has shaped the preferences of experimental subjects. However, it seems already a
little bit closer to real social environments than any even more stylized single-game
environment. Here, the multi-game indirect evolutionary analysis of Gu¨th and
Napel15 is extended to the domain of psychological games, using preferences of the
Falk-Fischbacher type, which reflects not only inequity aversion but also intention-
based reciprocity. We deem it interesting to see whether the way in which fairness
preferences are modelled matters. A direct comparison with Gu¨th and Napel’s
results is contained in section 6.
15Cf. Stahl and Haruvy (2002) for an experimental study of multi-game environments.
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4. THE MODEL
Repeatedly, two agents who are randomly drawn from a single population are
given the chance to create a surplus (the ‘pie’), and subsequently to decide about
its distribution in a single-shot game. Taking the population to be large enough to
rule out repeated-game effects, agents are assumed to act fully rationally according
to commonly known preferences for the possible outcomes of the single-shot game
presented to them. Utility is not restricted to own material payoff, but it is the
expected material payoff which defines an agent’s fitness or reproductive success in
the evolutionary process imposed on the population.16 As expressed in a pointed
way by Samuelson (2001, p. 226f): “Nature can thus mislead her agents, in that
preferences and fitness can diverge, but cannot mislead herself, in that high fitness
wins the day.”
4.1. The Material World
A matched pair of agents faces either of two different games: The ultimatum
game or the dictator game. In the ultimatum game one of the two players is
randomly (with probability 0.5) selected to be the proposer (role X), who proposes
how to split the pie of one unit. The amount he or she offers is denoted by c ∈ [0, 1].
The other player (the responder, role Y ) decides whether to accept the proposed
split or to reject it. The resulting material payoffs are (piX , piY ) = (1 − c, c) and
(piX , piY ) = (0, 0), respectively.
In the dictator game the agents are also assigned to be proposer or responder
with equal probability. The proposer decides how to split the pie by offering c ∈
[0, 1] to the responder. In contrast to the ultimatum game the responder must
accept, so resulting material payoffs are (piX , piY ) = (1− c, c).
Which game the agents play is determined randomly, with probability λ ∈ [0, 1]
for the ultimatum game and 1 − λ for the dictator game. The game realization
becomes common knowledge. In both events material payoffs (piX , piY ) determine
reproductive success.
Differences between dictator game versus ultimatum game very loosely resemble
those between competitive market interaction versus private interaction: Success
in the ultimatum game depends on mutual cooperation and is influenced by both
agents’ behavior; in the dictator game one player is a mere price taker without
influence on terms of trade. It will be interesting to see how evolutionary stable
preferences depend on the frequency or ‘importance’ of each type of interaction in
agents’ lives.
16See Benaim and Weibull (2003) for a concise overview of models with agents who learn or
imitate rather than biologically reproduce which can be very closely approximated by evolutionary
models coming from a purely biological background.
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4.2. Agents’ Preferences
Agents have fairness preferences as defined by Falk and Fischbacher (2001).
We prefer not to explicitly restate their quite complex utility function here, since
we will directly work with the reciprocity equilibria calculated for dictator and
ultimatum games by Falk an Fischbacher. Importantly, utility functions uXi (·) and
uYi (·) which represent preferences of a given agent i in the roles of proposer X or
responder Y , respectively, have the free parameters ρXi , ε
X
i and ρ
Y
i , ε
Y
i .
17
Agents’ behavior depends on these free parameters. Most important is the
reciprocity parameter ρki ∈ R+, which describes how much weight agent i places on
reciprocal behavior in role k ∈ {X,Y }. For ρki = 0 the considered agent is purely
interested in his or her own material payoff, behaving as in most orthodox economic
models. The rejection probability of ultimatum game offers below 50% turns out to
be strictly increasing in reciprocity parameter ρYi .
The second parameter, εki ∈ [0, 1], measures agent i’s pure concern for an eq-
uitable outcome in role k. Agents without any pure equity concern (εXi = ε
Y
i =
εi = 0) have an entirely intentions-driven notion of fairness. If no intentions can be
attributed to the opponent player, the considered agent maximizes material payoff.
In contrast, for agents with εi > 0 equitable splits of the pie are valuable even in
the absence of intentions. This is best seen in the dictator game where (anticipated
or own) reciprocal behavior plays no role: An agent with εi = 0 always offers c = 0
whereas an agent with εi = 1 may offer up to half of the pie.18
In principle, preferences could evolve role-dependently (ρXi 6= ρYi and εXi 6= εYi ),
so that an agent’s way of evaluating intentions and material consequences of choices
depends on his or her role in the game. However, the beauty of the idea to outfit
agents with a utility function which reflects general agent characteristics like equity
concern or reciprocity preference is that agents generally apply this utility function
to the situations they face – regardless of the actual situation and regardless of
their role in the situation.19 Therefore the parameters are assumed to evolve role-
independently in the following, i. e. ρXi ≡ ρYi ≡ ρi and εXi ≡ εYi ≡ εi for any given
17Player i’s utility at any terminal node t of the game tree is the sum of his or her material
payoff associated with t and a reciprocity payoff which is calculated decision node by decision
node along the path to t and weighted by parameter ρi. For each of i’s decision nodes n along
the path to t, the products of a term measuring the (un)kindness of others to i which has lead
to n (here, parameter εi may matter) and a term measuring i’s reciprocated (un)kindness from
choosing to move further towards t are added up. Equilibrium calculations are complex.
18The actual offer depends on the pure equity-concern and the reciprocity parameters.
19The possibility that agents can condition equity concern on the game and / or their role in it is
explored in Gu¨th and Napel (2002). If real economic agents’ fair behavior is adequately described
by a utility function with one or a few fairness-related parameters at all, the same parameters
should be valid for more than a special class of games. To expect them to be valid in all games
seems, however, too much.
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FIG. 1 Acceptance probability p∗ of agent with reciprocity parameter ρY for offer c in
the ultimatum game
agent. Note that, moreover, the same two parameters ρi and εi will be applied to
both ultimatum and dictator games, i. e. the social part of agent i’s preferences is
assumed to not depend on the realized type of game.
5. EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS
First, ultimatum and the dictator games are studied separately, corresponding
to the cases λ = 1 and λ = 0. Then, the mixed environment consisting of both
games is analyzed. When agents A and B interact, we will in the following write
ρX (ρY ) for that agent’s (role-independent) reciprocity parameter who is assigned
to role X (role Y ).
5.1. The Ultimatum Game
Equilibrium play20 results in acceptance probability
p∗ =
 min
{
1, cρY ·(1−2c)(1−c)
}
if c < 12
1 if c ≥ 12
(1)
for offer c conditional on the responder’s reciprocity parameter ρY 6= 0, and p∗ = 1
for ρY = 0. An offer of half of the pie or more is always accepted for sure. This is not
the case for lower offers, for which the acceptance probability is strictly decreasing
in ρY (see figure 1).
The share c∗ offered by the proposer X to the responder Y in equilibrium is
20The computations are given in detail in Falk and Fischbacher (2001, appendix 3). Cf. foot-
note 17 above.
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FIG. 2 Split c∗ proposed by an agent with reciprocity parameter ρX to one with reci-
procity parameter ρY in the ultimatum game
given by
c∗ = max
{1 + 3ρY −√1 + 6ρY + ρ2Y
4ρY
,
1
2
· (1− 1
ρX
)
}
(2)
for ρX , ρY 6= 0. For ρX > ρY = 0 and ρY > ρX = 0, c∗ is (2)’s limit for ρY ↓ 0 and
ρX ↓ 0, respectively, while for ρX = ρY = 0 one obtains c∗ = 0 (corresponding to
‘traditional’ preferences).
The equilibrium share c∗ is defined by two expressions. The first depends only
on the responder’s reciprocal inclination ρY and is the maximizer of proposer’s
expected utility in case that the responder’s concern for reciprocity is ‘binding’ –
dominating the insufficiently pronounced reciprocity concern of the proposer. The
associated share of the pie is just high enough to ensure acceptance (p = 1). The
second expression depends only on the proposer’s ρX and reflects how much the
proposer would voluntarily offer in order to maximize utility in the light of his or her
intrinsic concern for a fair outcome. As either ρX or ρY grow large, c∗ approaches
1/2 (see figure 2).
The equilibrium offer is the maximum of both expressions. This means that if
a selfish proposer plays against a reciprocal responder, the offer is increasing in ρY .
If the responder’s concern for reciprocity is low, the offer depends on the fairness
concern of the proposer, hence it is increasing in ρX . If both players are selfish, the
offer is close to zero.
Agent A’s role in interaction with agent B is random, with probability 0.5 for
either role. The expected material payoff pi∗AU of agent A with preference parameters
(ρA, εA) who is matched with agent B to play the ultimatum game is the average
of the payoffs he or she receives in both roles. This turns out to be:
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FIG. 3 Expected payoff pi∗AU of agent A with reciprocity parameter ρA in the ultimatum
game when matched against an agent B with reciprocity parameter ρB
pi∗AU (ρA, ρB) =

5ρA+3−
√
1+6ρA+ρ2A
8ρA
if ρA ≥ −2ρB
ρB+1−
√
1+6ρB+ρ2B
(a)
3ρB−3+
√
1+6ρB+ρ2B
8ρB
if ρA ≤ ρB(ρB−1)1+ρB (b)
3ρA+1−
√
1+6ρA+ρ2A
8ρA
+ ρB−1+
√
1+6ρB+ρ2B
8ρB
if −2ρB
ρB+1−
√
1+6ρB+ρ2B
> ρA >
ρB(ρB−1)
1+ρB
. (c)
(3)
Figure 3 illustrates this. Expected payoff depends on both agents’ concerns for
reciprocity, captured by ρA and ρB .
There are three cases. In case (a), ρA is large compared to ρB and thus behavior
in both possible role realizations is determined by agent A’s strong concern for
fairness. Agent A’s payoff is strictly decreasing in ρA. So evolution would drive
ρ down until case (c) applies: The population share of agents with payoffs below
average (with a higher ρ) will decrease and the share of agents with a payoff above
average (with a lower ρ) will increase.21
Case (b) applies if ρA is small compared to ρB . Then, behavior in both roles
is determined by ρB , and agent A’s payoff is constant in ρA. Given the symmetry
of our setup – both agents are drawn from the same population – this is similar to
21We are intentionally a bit sloppy in describing evolutionary dynamics. In order to be precise
we would have to define a payoff-monotonic selection dynamic which is either started from an
interior initial state (in which every ρ is present) or is augmented by an innovative mutation
process which ensures that every ρ gets a chance to spread. We refrain from a formal treatment
because the technicalities of properly dealing with the state space ∆(R+) consisting of probability
distributions µ on the nonnegative real line are immense and do not add anything to our main
argument. See Oechssler and Riedel (2002) for a flavor of the mathematical techniques that would
be necessary.
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case (a), but now from agent B’s point of view: Payoff is higher for lower ρB so
that evolution again drives ρ down until case (c) applies.
In the intermediate case (c), ρA and ρB do not differ too much. The proposer
(regardless of whether agent A or B is given this role) offers a split that maxi-
mizes his or her own material payoff subject to the binding constraint imposed
by the rejection behavior of the responder, i. e. c∗ depends only on the responder’s
reciprocity parameter. Then agent A’s (B’s) payoff is increasing in ρA (ρB). Evolu-
tion results in ρ in the entire population approaching infinity within the variability
bound defining case (c). This is in the following referred to as ρ ‘diverging’.
Whatever the initial distribution of the reciprocity parameter in the population
is, ρ will diverge. For the ultimatum game this implies an equal split in the limit.
It is in the nature of this split, that it is always offered for strategic reasons, i. e.
to prevent the responder from rejecting, not because of the proposer’s intrinsic
motivation.
5.2. The Dictator Game
The split c∗ offered by the proposer X in the dictator game in equilibrium
depends only on his or her own reciprocity parameter ρX and pure outcome-concern
parameter εX :
c∗ = max
{
0,
1
2
· (1− 1
εXρX
)
}
. (4)
A proposer offers a positive amount if εXρX > 1, which means that he or she is
reasonably concerned about reciprocity in the unintentional case. No matter how
large εXρX is, the offer is never greater than half. Equation (4) corresponds to the
second term in (2), i. e. the possible ‘voluntary offer’ in the ultimatum game, where
εXρX replaces ρX . Here, the receiver has no choice but to accept and therefore
the outcome is ‘unintentional’ in the sense of Falk and Fischbacher (2001); this is
reflected by a ‘discounting’ of reciprocity parameter ρX by pure equity concern εX
in the dictator game. A given agent always offers weakly less in the dictator game
than in the ultimatum game, because 0 ≤ εX ≤ 1.
Agent A plays the dictator game with agent B and is assigned the proposer role
with probability 0.5. His or her expected material payoff pi∗AD in equilibrium is then
given by:
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FIG. 4 Expected payoff pi∗AD of agent A with parameters εA and ρA in the dictator game
when matched against an agent B with parameters εB and ρB
pi∗AD (εA, ρA, εB , ρB) =

1
2 if εAρA ≤ 1 and εBρB ≤ 1 (I)
1
4 +
1
4εAρA
if εAρA > 1 and εBρB ≤ 1 (II)
3
4 − 14εBρB if εAρA ≤ 1 and εBρB > 1 (III)
1
2 +
1
4εAρA
− 14εBρB if εAρA > 1 and εBρB > 1. (IV)
(5)
We have four cases, illustrated by figure 4. In cases (II) and (III) either of the
two agents offers a positive amount to the other agent when he or she is in the role
of proposer. The expected payoff for such ‘generous’ behavior is smaller than in
case (I), and strictly decreasing in the agent’s parameters ρ and ε. Cases (II) and
(III) are hence unstable – evolution will shift preferences towards case (I).
In case (IV) both agents as proposers share the pie with the receiver; their payoff
need not be smaller than in case (I). Still, material payoff is decreasing in each
agent’s individual parameters ρ and ε, so again a payoff-monotonic evolutionary
process drives agents’ preferences towards case (I).
For parameter constellations in case (I) both agents are only weakly interested
in fairness; both offer c∗ = 0 as proposers. The case applies as long as the product of
the parameters for reciprocity ρ and the pure equity-concern ε is smaller or equal to
unity for both agents. All such parameter constellations are behaviorally equivalent,
so that any of them corresponds to an evolutionary stable state.22 Constellations
falling into case (I) are the only stable ones.
This implies that in the long run agents offer zero in the dictator game and
22Here, we refer to stability in the spirit of neutrally stable strategies and Lyapunov dynamic
stability (see e. g. Weibull 1995).
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FIG. 5 Expected payoff pi∗A of agent A with parameters εA and ρA in the ‘game of life’
when matched against an agent B with parameters εB and ρB for λ = 0.5
thus cannot be distinguished from selfish payoff maximizers. Still, the model allows
agents to have a preference for fairness up to a level that does not affect behavior in
the dictator game. The ‘upper bound’ on this hidden fairness is given by ρ · ε ≤ 1;
any combination of concern for reciprocity ρ and pure concern for equity ε that
satisfies this condition can persist in the population if only the dictator game is
played.
5.3. The Mixed Environment
Let us now consider the stylized ‘game of life’ in which agents get randomly
involved either in a ultimatum or a dictator game. The payoff pi∗A of agent A facing
agent B given the probability λ ∈ [0, 1] to play the ultimatum game and probability
1− λ to play the dictator game is
pi∗A(εA, ρA, εB , ρB , λ) = λ · pi∗AU (ρA, ρB) + (1− λ) · pi∗AD (εA, ρA, εB , ρB). (6)
This expected material payoff function is illustrated for λ = 1/2 and several values
of εA and εB in figure 5.23 Total expected payoff is increasing in payoff pi∗AU (·)
from the ultimatum game and the payoff pi∗AD (·) from the dictator game. Hence
23Note the saddle points (1,1) and (2,2) in the cases of εA = εB = 1 and εA = εB = 0.5,
respectively, and that a saddle point – corresponding to an evolutionary stable state if ε were
fixed (or is restricted as in section 5.4) – does not exist for εA = εB ≈ 0.
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evolution would favor preferences that maximize pi∗AU (·) and pi∗AD (·) at the same
time if this were possible.
Indeed, this is possible for the Falk-Fischbacher preferences considered here: The
maximum payoff in the dictator game is reached for any parameter constellation
with ρ · ε ≤ 1. The pure equity concern parameter ε can always totally compensate
a high reciprocity concern ρ by being smaller or equal to 1/ρ. So, the ‘optimal’,
material payoff-maximizing preferences in the dictator game can be reached for any
level of ρ. In the light of our earlier analysis the evolutionary limit outcome in the
mixed environment is hence a diverging reciprocity parameter ρ and convergence
of the pure equity concern parameter ε to zero such that ρ · ε ≤ 1.
In the limit, agents behave very fairly whenever their counterpart can recipro-
cate, but show no pure concern for equity at all. The long-run results are equal splits
in the ultimatum game and full appropriation of the pie in the dictator game, i. e.
we obtain a simple superimposition of the long-run outcomes in the separate com-
ponents of our stylized ‘game of life’. With parameter ρ diverging and ε converging
towards zero, agents reciprocate strongly in situations that imply intentionality but
do not care at all about fairness when it comes to situations where intentions play
no role.
5.4. Restricted Parameters in the Mixed Environment
With two free parameters and two games, it is not surprising – though neither
trivial – that evolution brings about ‘optimal’ behavior for isolated dictator and
ultimatum game environments also in the combined habitat. While our agents are
unable to have different sets of parameters for reciprocity and pure equity concern
in ultimatum and dictator game, respectively, i. e. they cannot discriminate directly
between the games, they succeed to indirectly discriminate based on distinctive fea-
tures of the games (here: intentionality). It can be questioned whether the degrees
of freedom in the social component of our preferences in reality match or exceed
the different classes of social interaction.24 Humans seem to adjust behavior to a
specific situation only to some extent. It therefore seems interesting and reasonable
to limit nature’s freedom in shaping agents’ preferences25 by restricting the possi-
ble range of the pure outcome-concern parameter ε, which applies in unintentional
situations.
One practical possibility is to impose an exogenous lower bound εl > 0 for
parameter ε, so that εl ≤ ε ≤ 1 is required instead of 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1. This situation
24Exogenous costs of discrimination by a given agent’s (global) preferences would probably play
a central role in a theoretical investigation of this relationship.
25The available preferences are already limited by the specific family of utility functions chosen
by us. See Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (1998) for a model with finite strategy space and no such
restriction.
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FIG. 6 Expected payoff pi∗A of agent A with parameters εA = εl = 0.5 and ρA in the
‘game of life’ when matched against an agent B with parameters εB = εl = 0.5 and ρB
for several values of λ
differs from the above in that a strong concern for reciprocity cannot completely
be blanked out in the dictator game by a low ε. An agent’s behavior in dictator-
realizations of the ‘game of life’ is thus no longer de facto independent from that
in ultimatum-realizations.
Given the bound εl, the dictator game continues to induce persistent downward
pressure on parameter ε for ρ ≥ 1/εl. Therefore, for ρ ≥ 1/εl the evolutionary stable
outcome involves ε = εl. At the same time the ultimatum game puts persistent
upward pressure on reciprocity parameter ρ. This has the following implications
for ρ:
For small values of λ, the dictator game is ‘important’ enough in agents’ lives
to imply ρ · εl = 1 or ρ = 1/εl. This results in a zero offer in the dictator game and
c =
1 + 3 1εl −
√
1 + 6 1εl +
1
ε2l
4 1εl
(7)
in the ultimatum game. For example, a value of εl = 0.25 implies a split of
(piX , piY ) ≈ (0.59, 0.41) or εl = 0.125 implies (piX , piY ) ≈ (0.55, 0.45) in the ulti-
matum game in the long run. The imposed restriction thus slightly reduces eq-
uitableness in ultimatum offers without consequences for selfish behavior in the
dictator game.
The influence of parameter λ on the payoffs is illustrated by figure 6. The saddle
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FIG. 7 The critical value λ0(εl) at which ρ = 1/εl ceases to be an evolutionary stable
point
point at (ρA, ρB) = (2, 2), corresponding to a stable state with ρ = 1/εl, is barely
visible for λ = 0.7 and no longer exists for λ = 0.9. In fact, there is a critical level
of λ above which (ρA, ρB) = (1/εl, 1/εl) is no longer stable and ρ diverges. This
critical level can be calculated by analyzing expected payoff for values of ρ > 1/εl;
if it is lower (higher) than for ρ = 1/εl the latter combination is (is not) stable.
Constellations ρ > 1/εl belong to case (c) in the ultimatum game and case (IV) –
involving positive offers by both agents – in the dictator game. The material payoff
of agent A in the ‘game of life’ is therefore
pi∗A(εA, ρA, εB , ρB , λ) = λ
[
3ρA + 1−
√
1 + 6ρA + ρ2A
8ρA
+
ρB − 1 +
√
1 + 6ρB + ρ2B
8ρB
]
+(1− λ)
[
1
2
+
1
4εAρA
− 1
4εBρB
]
. (8)
The marginal payoff to agent A from greater ρA is
∂pi∗A(εA, ρA, εB , ρB , λ)
∂ρA
=
εAλ(1 + 3ρA) + (2λ− 2− ρAλ)
√
1 + 6ρA + ρ2A
8εAρA
√
1 + 6ρA + ρ2A
(9)
and can be analyzed for ρA > 1/εl and εA = εl in order to find out at which critical
level λ0 the combination of selfish dictator offers and (moderately) fair ultimatum
offers becomes unstable. A’s marginal payoff is negative for values of λ up to the
critical level
λ0(εl) =
2
√
1 + 6εl +
1
ε2l
3 + εl + (2− εl)
√
1 + 6εl +
1
ε2l
(10)
and then positive. For λ ≥ λ0(εl) evolution results in diverging parameter ρ because
in this case and for ρA > 1/εl and ρB > 1/εl the expected payoff pi∗A(·) is strictly
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increasing in ρA. As illustrated in figure 7, λ0(εl) is strictly decreasing in the
exogenous lower bound on pure equity concern εl.26
So when the ultimatum game is played very frequently compared to the dictator
game (λ ≥ λ0), the reciprocity parameter ρ diverges and the pure outcome concern
resides at ε = εl. This implies equal splits in both games in the long run.27 Loosely
speaking, if agents interact in comparatively many ‘private’ situations captured by
the ultimatum game compared to few ‘market’ situations reflected by the dictator
game, they develop a strong notion of fairness.
6. COMPARISON WITH GU¨TH AND NAPEL (2002)
Recall that the crucial difference between this model and that of Gu¨th and
Napel (2002) is the considered class of preferences. Agents’ sense of fairness is
limited to inequity aversion in the paper of Gu¨th and Napel, while here a partly
intention-based preference for reciprocation is investigated.
Results of the separate analysis of ultimatum and dictator game are qualitatively
the same. In the ultimatum game agents in the role of the responder benefit from
inequity aversion as well as from reciprocation, because the proposer anticipates
that a small offer might be rejected. Evolution leads agents who exclusively play
the ultimatum game to such high levels of inequity aversion or reciprocation, that
in the long run a rather equitable or even equal split is reached (this depends on
the precise utility specification).
In the dictator game, in contrast, both inequity aversion and reciprocal behavior
are detrimental to an agent’s average success, as it leads him or her to voluntarily
give part of the pie away. Still, in Gu¨th and Napel’s investigation as well as this one,
agents can be inequity averse to any degree that fails to actually affect proposer
behavior. In the analysis by Gu¨th and Napel, this upper bound to stable inequity
aversion of dictators is driving results for the mixed environment. Either the long-
run level of inequity aversion in the ultimatum game is below this bound, resulting
in no behaviorally relevant interaction between the two games, or it is above. In
the latter case, the given composition of the stylized ‘game of life’ determines a
stable level that, loosely speaking, balances marginal benefits and costs of inequity
aversion. In our analysis the situation is more complicated due to the presence of
two free parameters instead of one. The original model of Falk and Fischbacher
(2001) allows for both: Strong reciprocation and no inequity aversion in uninten-
tional cases at all. If the possible discrepancy between these two aspects of fairness
is not restricted exogenously, the reciprocity parameters goes to infinity and agents
26It falls from λ0 = 1 for εl −→ 0 to a minimum of λ0 = 2
√
2− 2 ≈ 0.838 for εl = 1.
27A diverging parameter ρ implies equal split in the ultimatum and dictator game as long as
parameter ε does not converge towards zero. For an explanation see section 5.1 on the ultimatum
game and section 5.2 on the dictator game.
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behave in both games just as if they were independent from each other. This cor-
responds to Gu¨th and Napel’s case in which agents can explicitly condition the
social component of their utility function – and hence fair behavior – on the game
at hand. Here, such a moral discrimination between games is achieved indirectly.
When ‘discounting’ of fairness in the unintentional case is limited, the outcome re-
sembles qualitatively the one of Gu¨th and Napel’s main case of game-independent
equity aversion.
It is a common result of either analysis that a high share of ultimatum games
affects evolutionary stable preferences. Gu¨th and Napel find moderate increases
in the stable level of inequity aversion after raising λ, while here the reciprocity
parameter diverges once a critical point is reached. Coincidentally, the minimal level
at which the amount of ultimatum games played affects the outcome is similar in
both studies, about 80% in Gu¨th and Napel (2002) and around 85% for a wide range
of constellations here; below these thresholds, the contrasting long-run outcomes
for dictator and ultimatum games are independent of the precise composition of
the stylized ‘game of life’. In summary, both specifications of the utility function
evolution lead to qualitatively similar outcomes in ultimatum, dictator and mixed
environments. The impact that an explicit inclusion of reciprocal behavior has on
the evolutionary stable outcome is small in the considered class of games if the
flexibility increase from introducing an additional parameter is limited.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In general, psychological fairness models explain experimental results better
than more tractable equity-based models, which in turn perform better than the
default assumption of monetary payoff maximization. This success comes at the ex-
pense of additional free parameters, which have do be defended against accusations
of ad hoc ‘game fitting’, and often more complicated analysis with sometimes am-
biguous results. Since parameters can be such that an agent, in fact, has traditional
materialistic preferences, indirect evolutionary analysis provides a useful theoretical
benchmark. If under plausible modelling assumptions evolutionary forces selected
parameters that imply non-degenerate fairness preferences, this would corroborate
the post-experimental econometric estimations.
The relevance of fairness preference a priori can be expected to vary with the
decision situations at hand even if these are restricted to simple distribution tasks.
Our analysis suggests that preference for fair behavior has sound evolutionary rea-
sons, but – in line with experimental observations – more likely plays a significant
role in non-degenerate games with punishment opportunities, such as the ultima-
tum game, than in what is basically a one-player decision problem like the dictator
game. If Nature permits players to condition the social component of their pref-
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erences on different games (as investigated by Gu¨th and Napel 2002) or at least
indirectly on differences in games, the same agents can exhibit a pronounced sense
of fairness in one type of social interaction while they are entirely selfish in another
one. This is true even though preferences are assumed to evolve simultaneously in
a multi-game environment.
If Nature imposes physical or psychological restrictions on the variance in agents’
social attitudes across different games or different dimensions of fairness, the pre-
cise composition of the stylized ‘game of life’ faced by agents has an impact. In
our model, evolutionary pressure towards more reciprocal preferences created by
the ultimatum game is strong enough to induce quite equitable behavior (offers
above 40%) in this game independently of how frequently it is played. In contrast,
the success of evolutionary pressure towards more selfish preferences created by the
dictator game is sensitive to the share of dictatorial decision problems: If agents
most of the time face the more fairness-encouraging ultimatum game, they will
eventually feel it in their interest to be generous even as dictators. Whether this
asymmetry – a great share of fairness-encouraging games eliminates selfish behav-
ior in materialism-encouraging games, while the reverse is not true – in response
to possible changes in the composition of the environment is a more general phe-
nomenon or an artifact of our (and also Gu¨th and Napel’s) model specification
remains to be seen.
We have studied environmental and psychological determinants of material-
payoff maximization vs. social preferences in a particularly simple two-game envi-
ronment. In our view, this is an improvement compared to the usual analysis of
preferences in a single game. It highlights the importance of possibly unconscious
links between behavioral modes in different classes of interaction. Whether human
agents indeed face a binding restriction in their ability to discriminate between the
fairness implications of similar play in ultimatum and dictator games, reflected by
the reciprocity and pure equity concern parameters ρ and ε in our model, is an
empirical question. Experimental evidence on the ultimatum game is consistent
with both the unrestricted (section 5.3) and restricted evolution of ρ and ε (sec-
tion 5.4); evidence on the dictator game supports the restricted view, though not
our prediction of equal splits.28
It seems desirable to us to extend our ‘game of life’ to more than only ultimatum
and dictator games. First, an environment with more than two component games
would create a natural endogenous restriction on the two parameters of the con-
sidered Falk-Fischbacher reciprocal preferences – preventing the full ‘specialization’
observed in section 5.3 without exogenous restrictions as in section 5.4. Second,
reciprocal preferences are proposed as explanations for empirical observations of
28Dictator offers in Gu¨th and Napel (2002) continuously rise from zero to moderate positive
levels (assuming that marginal disutility of inequality is increasing).
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a considerable range of games, including e. g. trust and gift-exchange games, pub-
lic good games, and variants of the ultimatum game such as the best-shot game.
Analysis of the stability of reciprocal preferences should include these.
Another very desirable extension would be to relax our a priori restriction of
the class of feasible preferences to those of the Falk-Fischbacher type.29 These
include the neoclassical reference point of selfish materialism as well as salient
other special cases (e. g. purely intention-based fairness or a general equity concern).
They admittedly exclude many other types of agents, which are competing with
the traditional homo oeconomicus for economists’ attention, too.
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